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REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-CROSS APPELLANT 
BLAIR PEART dba NAVAJO TRAILS 
The Plaintiffs arguments appear to fall into three general categories: a challenge to 
the role that the United States Constitution plays in protecting parent's rights concerning 
decisions regarding the custody, care and upbringing of their children; a reassertion of an 
attack upon the validity of release and indemnification clauses which parents sign on behalf 
of their children; and the belief that because insurance coverage is available, upholding the 
validity of exculpatory and indemnification clauses somehow encourages a lack of care by 
the providers of recreational activities. None of the arguments merits reversing the trial 
court's decision regarding the validity of the indemnity provision. This Court should affirm 
the lower court's decision regarding the indemnity provision, or alternatively reverse the 
decision concerning the release provision, thereby granting summary judgment to defendant. 
A. The Constitution protects a parent's right to make decisions concerning the 
custody, care and nurture of a child which the state can neither supply nor hinder. 
Consequently, parents may sign contracts with exculpatory and indemnification clauses 
binding their minor children as part of their rights and obligations as parents. 
In its arguments, plaintiff consistently has asserted that public policy requires 
invalidating the contract of release and indemnity which Jessica Hawkin's mother signed on 
her behalf before undertaking a horseback ride to dinner. By invoking public policy, 
plaintiffs have brought the Constitutional issues to the fore. To assert public policy in this 
case necessarily disputes Jessica's parent's judgment that the family activity was safe enough 
to risk and that Jessica, age 11, should accompany her family on a horseback ride. Peart and 
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Navajo Trails do not raise this argument on behalf of Jessica's parents. Rather, defendant 
raises the argument to call attention to the potential precedential consequences of Utah's 
adopting a rule permitting retrospectively setting aside signed contracts. 
Parents have primary responsibility and freedom concerning the care, custody and 
nurture of a child. Troxel v. Granville, U.S. ,120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 
(2000). The issue in Troxel involved a court's ordering grandparent visitation. The child's 
mother appealed. Id. at 2061. After noting that there was no allegation that the parent was 
unfit (and there is no such allegation in this case), the Supreme Court explained that there is a 
presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children: 
[0]ur Constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a 
child is a mere creature of the State and, on the contrary, asserted 
that parents generally have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional 
obligations....The law's concept of the family rests on a 
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, 
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's 
difficult decisions. More important, historically it has been 
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in 
the best interests of their children. 
Id., citing, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) 
(alteration in original)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The Court noted that Parham recognized on numerous occasions that "the relationship 
between parent and child is constitutionally protected" and that American jurisprudence 
historically reflected Western civilization's concepts of the family as a unit with broad 
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parental authority over minor children. Troxel, 120 S.Ct. at 2060. The Court observed that, 
"so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children, (i.e. is fit), there will normally 
be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further 
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that 
parent's children." Troxel, 120 S.Ct. at 2061, citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304, 113 
S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). Concluding that the Washington statute which permitted 
any person to petition the court for visitation rights at any time was unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court determined that the due process clause did not permit the state to infringe on 
the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge 
believed a better decision could be made. 120 S.Ct. at 2063-64. 
In this case, that fundamental child rearing decision involved permitting the minor 
child, Jessica Hawkins, to participate in a family recreational activity of horseback riding for 
which her mother signed a release and indemnity form. Implicit in the Troxel analysis is a 
recognition and honoring of the parents' role in child rearing which extends beyond decisions 
dealing with medical treatment or the education of children. Id. Under that paradigm, and 
consistent with the rationale of the Troxel case, the contract which Jessica's mother signed 
thereby allowing her daughter to participate in the family recreational activity was, as a 
matter of public policy, valid and enforceable. It is representative of the day-to-day decisions 
which parents routinely make. Such decisions include, for example, what activities their 
children will engage in, with whom and under what circumstances their children will play, 
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their children's travels to various places with or without them, their children's engaging in 
music, speech, little league, drama, soccer, skiing or ballet lessons, and their children's 
participation in a variety of youth organizations and programs. All these activities carry 
some potential of risk, including unforeseen consequences, but nonetheless are the kinds of 
decisions which parents routinely and rightfully make in raising their children free from 
interference or second-guessing on the basis of alleged public policy considerations. These 
day-to-day decisions are no less worthy of constitutional protection than those other 
decisions which the Court specifically enumerated in the Troxel decision, and the decisions 
fall under the penumbra of a parent's responsibility for the care, custody and nurture of a 
child. 120 S.Ct. at 2058-2063. 
In this regard, plaintiffs argument that parents do not have unlimited rights to make 
choices for their children, using the example of parents entering into a contract for marriage 
of their children, is inapposite. The law does not consent to a minor's singular ability to 
enter into a contract nor to marry because the law requires consent for the effected parties to 
enter into a marriage relationship. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-9 (2000). Moreover, a marriage 
creates a new family relationship and therefore it is not part of the parent-child relationship. 
See generally, UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1999); T.G. v. State, 987 P.2d 1272 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999). In other words, parties to a marriage must themselves consent and parents no 
longer play a primary legal role in the custody, care and nurture of children in their marriage. 
Thus, a child's marriage to another stands on a very different footing than the relationship a 
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minor child has with her parents who are responsible for her custody, care, and nurture. 
Troxel, 120 S.Ct. at 2060. 
B. This contract between adults is neither invalid nor violative of public policy. 
Contrary to plaintiffs assertions, the effect of upholding the exculpatory and 
indemnification contract in this case effects a mere contractual recognition that one party will 
assume the risk of a particular activity. It does not become a matter of eliminating 
accountability for a party's actions. Utah long has recognized the validity of release and 
indemnification clauses. Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 372 (Utah 1990); 
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983). In Shell 
Oil, this Court considered whether an indemnity agreement might be invalidated as violative 
of public policy and concluded that unless duress, deception, a disparity of bargaining power 
or negotiations conducted at less than arm's length were present, the contracts would be 
valid. 658 P.2d at 1189. Plaintiff cannot claim that the contract meets any of those 
requirements for invalidity in this case. That is particularly so because Melinda Hawkins 
initialed or signed each part of the form. See, Defendant's Addendum to its Appellee's 
Cross-Appellant's Brief at 000002. Additionally, Utah long has recognized the rule that its 
citizens should be free to contract on their own terms "without the indulgence of paternalism 
by courts in the alleviation of one side or the other" from the effects of a contract from which 
one party wishes to be excused. Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah.2d 272, 275, 332 P.2d 989, 
990-91 (1958). It is not the function of the court to "renegotiate the contract of the parties." 
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Id. Thus, exculpatory clauses are valid. See e.g., DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 824-25 (Utah 
1978). 
The Scott decision from Washington does not control the outcome of this case. See, 
Appellee's Brief at 15-18 citing Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 
1992). The child's mother here had the opportunity to initial and sign a clear contract 
highlighting its effect and repeating its allocation of responsibility for indemnification. She 
had the option to decline the defendant's services, which were not of a public service nature, 
demonstrating the validity of the contract and the lack of factors which would invalidate the 
exculpatory or indemnification provisions. Offering horseback riding does not qualify as a 
required public service such as that the California court contemplated. See, Tunkl v. Regents 
of University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). When not engaged in a public service, 
parties may bargain against liability for harm caused by their ordinary negligence in the 
performance of their contractual duties. Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 904 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Like building a home, providing trail riding opportunities is not a 
public service in Utah. Russ, 905 P.2d at 907. Further, parties can enforce releases even 
after an event, as commonly occurs in settling cases. Simonson v. Travis, 728 P.2d 999, 1002 
(Utah 1996). 
Other jurisdictions have recognized the validity of releases and indemnification 
provisions for spectators or participants in recreational activities. See, e.g., Heil Valley 
Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1989); Valley National Bank v. National 
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Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 736 P.2d 1186 (Ariz.App. 1987). A Utah 
federal court also has done so. Zollman v. Myers, 797 F.Supp. 923, 927 (D.Utah 1992) 
(snowmobile activity). Other jurisdictions have recognized the validity of parents signing 
releases involving their minor children. Cooper v. United States Ski Ass 'n., 2000 WL 
1159066 (Colo.App. 2000) (skiing activity); Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 
201, 204 (Ohio 1998) (soccer association); Hohe v. San Diego Unified School District, 224 
Cal.App.3d 1559, 274 Cal.Rptr. 647, 649 (Cal.App. 4th Div. 1990) (release from injuries 
during a hypnotism show). Because parents may make decisions for their children 
concerning their custody, care, and upbringing, the law recognizes the validity of these types 
of exculpatory and indemnity agreements. Utah, consistent with its case law in other areas, 
should do likewise. 
C. The presence or absence of liability insurance plays no more role in determining 
liability when a child is involved than when an adult is involved. 
In its Cross-Respondent's Brief, plaintiff seems to suggest that the existence of 
insurance is somehow relevant concerning a determination of the contract's validity and the 
assessment of liability in this case. See, Brief at 8. It is not and the court and parties should 
avoid mention of insurance. Utah Rule of Evidence 411; CR. Owens Trucking Corp. v. 
Stewart, 29 Utah 2d 353, 356, 509 P.2d 821, 823 (1973); Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 
261, 264-65, 409 P.2d 121, 123 (1965). However, if relevant, the existence of any potential 
insurance is no more dispositive of the issues in this case than if the injured person were an 
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adult rather than a child. The contract existed between competent adults with Melinda 
Hawkins signing on behalf of her daughter. See, Defendant's Addendum to its 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 000002. Consequently, the proper focus of the analysis 
is that of a contract between competent adults, not between a business and a minor child. 
The cost of doing business increases with the costs of judgments against the business, 
whether the business pays those costs directly or through increasing insurance payments. 
Insurers set premiums on the basis of their perception of the risks involved, and it is 
reasonable to conclude that the insurers consider what risks might be covered or excluded on 
the basis of contracts between the parties providing and receiving the services. Thus, 
presumably any insurance company would charge a premium based on its risk assessment 
including the insured's use of exculpatory or indemnity clauses. Nonetheless, plaintiffs 
discussion of this issue misses the mark. At issue is the validity of the contract entered into 
by two competent parties, one of whom acted as a parent for her minor child. By signing the 
contract, the parent allowed her child to engage in a family recreational activity. She should 
not now be able to escape the consequences of the contract she signed as a competent adult 
parent. 
The types of release and indemnification contracts at issue in this case affect activities 
in which minors routinely engage. They include sports in school or with private 
organizations, youth recreational and organizational activities such as scouting, opportunities 
to learn various skills or to pursue various hobbies and talents such as music and speech, and 
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taking trips as part of a child's education or recreation. They effect the providing of services 
and activities for tourists, vacationers, and Utah families seeking to enjoy the natural 
wonders of this panoramic state. A child cannot sign an enforceable contract to engage in 
those activities or to bear the risks. Without a parent's or guardian's signature, the cost of 
enjoying and of providing these opportunities necessarily increases, perhaps beyond the point 
of their being reasonably available for most families and youth. Consequently, the 
implications of eliminating these releases which have served to help organizations provide 
various opportunities for youth and adults at a reasonable cost, could be substantially 
diminished if the Court holds invalid these types of routinely utilized forms. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the above reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision 
upholding the validity of the agreement's indemnity provisions or alternatively reverse the 
lower court's decision invalidating the release provision. This Court, therefore, should enter 
summary judgment in favor of defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HIGBEE & JENSEN, P.C. 
Matthew T.Graff (8605) 
Of Attorneys for Appellee-Cross Appellant Blair 
Peart dba Navajo Trails 
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